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1 INTRODUCTION
Decentralization has quietly become one of the
fashions of our time. Over the last ten or fifteen
years, numerous governments in less developed
countries have begun or seriously considered de-
centralizing. Many bilateral donors and interna-
tional development agencies (including various
United Nations agencies and the Ford Founda-
tion) have sought to encourage this. These trends
persist and interest in the topic continues to grow.
The World Bank and the US Agency for Interna-
tional Development are currently initiating major
inquiries into the utility of various types of decen-
tralization for the advancement 'good government'
and fiscal responsibility.
A great deal of research has also been done on recent
experiments. This essay draws upon evidence that
has emerged from a large number of these studies'
to consider the promise and the limitations of
decentralization for the promotion of democratic
governance.
2 DEFINING DECENTRALIZATION
The term 'decentralization' has been applied to
several types of initiatives, four of which are worth
mentioning here. It sometimes refers to privatiza-
tion - the transfer of tasks formerly performed by
state agencies to the private sector. Its advocates
argue that this constitutes both decentralization
(since power is being passed from central govern-
ments to private firms) and democratization (since,
in their view, it increases choice for 'customers'
who receive services). But it is excluded from this
discussion, partly for reasons of space and partly
because its critics have raised serious doubts about
both of these sets of claims. They argue that the
private sector firms which take over tasks from the
I draw mainly upon the unpublished work of analysts who
presented findings on three recent occasions: a Ford Foundation
symposium on decentralization in five African nations in Nairobi,
October, 1993; a World Bank workshop at Harper's Ferry, West
Virginiainjune, 1994; and an international conference on 'Democratic
Decentralization in Africa and Asia' (supported by the Overseas
Development Administration) at the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, University of London in September, 1994.
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state are themselves often quite large so that, far
from being decentralized, power is actually passing
from one major power centre to others. They also
argue that user charges, which often come with
privatization, exclude many poorer people and thus
do not necessarily increase choice.
Second, the term 'decentralization' refers to
deconcentration - that is, the dispersal of agents of
central governments into lower-level arenas. If the
higher authority which does the deconcentrating
is democratically elected, this has some relevance
to a discussion of democratic governance. But it is
usually undertaken by governments which are
not democratically accountable. Indeed, it is often
used as a device to provide such governments with
greater penetration into and control over lower-
level arenas and civil society (organized interests).
This is most tellingly apparent from Njuguna
Ng'ethe's analysis of deconcentration in Moi's
Kenya,2 which made it more not less difficult to
promote democracy. For these reasons, decon-
centration will be excluded from this brief analysis.3
Third, 'decentralization' sometimes refers to down-
ward fiscal transfers by which higher levels in a
system cede control over budgets and financial de-
cisions to lower levels. This authority can pass
either to deconcentrated bureaucrats and/or un-
elected appointees on the one hand, or to elected
politicians on the other. When the latter occurs,
fiscal decentralization becomes relevant to demo-
cratic governance. lt will therefore receive some
attention here.
Finally, 'decentralization' refers to devolution - the
transfer of resources, tasks and decision-making
power to lower-level authorities which are (a) largely
or wholly independent of the central government,
N. Ng'ethe, 'The Politics of Democratization through
Decentralization in Kenya', unpublished paper.
For reasons of space, we also exclude from this discussion a
variation on deconcentration - 'delegation' which is deconcentration
to parastatal agencies with some financial and administrative
separation from the main bureaucratic hierarchies.
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and (b) democratically elected. Devolution that is,
democratic decentralization - will therefore be our
main concern here.
In the discussion that follows, we look first at what
democratic decentralization can achieve when it
works well. We then turn to the impediments which
stand in the way of it working well, and conclude
with comments on how its successful working might
be facilitated.
3 WHEN IT WORKS WELL
Democratic decentralization, when it works well,
has many virtues. It is no panacea, but it can yield
substantial benefits. It encourges greater political
participation. The term 'participation' here partly
implies electoral participation - both voting and
taking part in election campaigns. Levels of both
tend to be high in Africa and Asia, and levels of
the latter often greatly exceed those common in
the West.
The term 'participation' here also refers to active
involvement in politics between elections - joining
or forming voluntary associations, contacting elected
politicians or bureaucrats, signing petitions, taking
part in meetings to voice appreciation, protests,
desires, etc. Levels of this type of participation vary
somewhat within Africa and Asia. In countries
where rulers have long repressed and intimidated
organized interests - including some former and
currently Leninist regimes, but also cases like
Côte d'Ivoire4 - these forms of participation are
seriously underdeveloped. But in such diverse places
as Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, the Philippines, India,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka levels are quite high by
international standards. Decentralization tends to
encourage moderate-to-substantial increases in
these forms of participation.
It also tends to enhance 'responsiveness' from gov-
ernment institutions, usually quite considerably.
This is true not only in the three countries where
decentralization has worked quite well - the
Philippines, various Indian states and possibly
Uganda - but in places where it has had more
See for example, R. Crook, 1991, 'State, society and political
institutions in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana' in J. Manor (ed), Rethink-
ingThird World Politics, London and New York: Longman: 213-41.
lam drawing here mainly on R. Crook and J. Manor, 'Enhancing
Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic
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ambiguous results like Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire
before the fiscal crisis of 1988, Hong Kong, and at
times, Nigeria. The speed of response often in-
creases markedly, since officials at lower levels
need no longer obtain higher approval before they
respond, or - when they do require approval - it
tends to come more quickly. The quantity of
responses - usually meaning small-scale develop-
ment projects - also increases, partly because
decentralization tends strongly to produce a shift
of resources away from large-scale projects like
major dams, hospitals, etc., to micro-level initia-
tives. The quality of such projects, as perceived by
ordinary citizens, also tends to improve somewhat.
This is true whether the test that we apply is either
(i) the congruence between projects implemented
and the needs of communities as identified by
citizens, or (ii) evidence from citizens on the satis-
factory or unsatisfactory nature of outputs.5
Decentralization can also improve the performance
of government institutions by enhancing quite
markedly the flow of information between them
and the general public. This is true of information
flows both from institutions downward to citizens,
and from citizens upward to government. District-
level health officials in one Indian state found that
a successful experiment with decentralization con-
tributed mightily to their effort to maximize the
number of children receiving free innoculations. It
did so because the huge number of newly elected
councillors were far better able to persuade parents
(especially mothers) of the benefits of the scheme
than bureaucrats had been before decentralization.
In the same state, the establishment of new councils
with fully 55,000 elected members created an army
of information-gatherers who fed reports, complaints
and demands constantly to officials at sub-district
and district levels. One of these bureaucrats, who
had been in charge of a district both before and after
decentralization, found that the amount of informa-
tion reaching him increased more than ten-fold. As
he put it, 'I thought! had been well informed under
the old set-up, but after the change, I realized that!
had known very little. It was a humbling experi-
ence.'6 (see following page for footnote.) Because
Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa', Report to the
Overseas Development Administration, January 1994. This project
received substantial support from ESCOR, the research committee
of the Overseas Development Administration, andentailed extensive
field research in Bangladesh, Karnstaka state in India, Ghana an&
Côte d'Ivoire.
they had so much more information, officials in that
state could respond far more effectively, thanks to
decentralization. They struggled to cope with infor-
mation overload, and they had to invest more time
and energy in checking the veracity of councillors'
claims on government resources, but they coped
reasonably well with these difficulties.
One crucially important aspect of this was the way
in which the new system yielded early warnings of
potential disasters in outlying areas - especially
droughts and outbreaks of disease in their early
stages. Word passed from local councillors to the
district-level where elected politicians had the
leverage to ensure that the government machinery
responded quickly, to prevent these problems from
getting out of control.
When it works well, decentralization can also re-
duce absenteeism among public employees. Work-
ers in, for example, local-level schools and medical
facilities who formerly turned up for work irregu-
larly find that once elected local councils are created,
their negligence gets reported to councillors who
have the power or the connections to ensure that
pressure is applied to them to mend their ways.
These employees also tend to work harder when
they are on the job and to adhere more closely to
the rules than before. The result is a significant
improvement in the provision of services at no extra
cost to taxpayers or the exchequer. It should be
stressed that improvements on this front occur less
often than gains in responsiveness. Evidence for
such changes emerges only from India's states and
from the Philippines.7 But it is still possible.
Another potential, but comparatively rare gain
from decentralization - for which we have evi-
dence only from India - is a decline in the overall
amount of corruption. This is not to say that the
number of people involved in corrupt acts declined.
Sincedecentralization always expands the number
of people with political influence, it inevitably in-
creases the numbers engaging in malfeasance. But
in India (Karnataka state), the creation of elected
councils yielded a system which was far more trans-
parent than the one that preceded it.
In the earlier system there, a group of four or five key
people at the sub-district level could conspire to
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steal very large proportions of government devel-
opment funds intended for grass roots projects,
without being detected. This was possible because
they were usually the only ones at that level who
knew the full amount of money available for devel-
opment. After decentralization, hundreds of people
in each sub-district had access to that information,
and this ruled out the old kind of concealment.
Enough people acted as watchdogs on one another
- bureaucrats on politicians and vice-versa, plus
members of rival political parties on each other -
that would be profiteers could only hope to pilfer
modest sums. The total amounts stolen thus
decreased.
Unfortunately, the absence of evidence of similar
trends outside India suggests that this kind of gain
is difficult to achieve. It may only be possible in
places where democratic politics has existed for
very long periods - and there are very few such
places. (This theme is examined more fully in the
next section of this article.)
Democratic decentralization also creates a very large
number of new opportunities for people who wish
to pursue politics as at least a part time career. This
eases frustration which can build up to dangerous
levels and can lead political activists into destruc-
tive factional infighting. It also enables them to
develop political skills which are hugely important
in making democratic systems work. Evidence of
this has emerged even from countries where decen-
tralization experienced significant difficulties. Those
who prove themselves to be especially adroit at
bargaining, representation, coalition-building and
policy design have some prospect of advancement,
while those who are less able often fall by the
wayside.
It has to be stressed that even when decentralization
works well, there are certain areas in which it tends
to fall short of expectations. These need to be under-
stood alongside the benefits if we are to have a real-
istic understanding of what it can and cannot achieve.
Much, though not all of the evidence from recent
research suggests that it is unrealistic to expect
decentralization to facilitate planning from local
arenas upward. This is true for several reasons.
Councils located quite near the village level face
Interview, Bangalore, 22 April 1993. Ibid., and E. Panganiban, 'Democratic decentralization in
contemporary times; the new local government code of the
Philippines', unpublished paper.
severe shortages of bureaucratic personnel to assist
elected politicians in organizing a plan. Councils
located at somewhat higher levels often have nu-
merous civil servants working for them, but their
careers have been spent issuing and executing or-
ders rather than gathering data and consulting
politicians and leaders of various interests, as they
need to do when constructing a plan. As a result,
'plans' tend to be politicians' rather random wish
lists hastily assembled at the last moment, after
inadequate consultation with others. To make mat-
ters worse, politicians and bureaucrats at higher
levels of governments tend to be reluctant to accept
proposals that come up from below, even though
they may loudly extol the virtues of decentralized
planning in public statements.
Recent studies also suggest that decentralization is
unlikely to contribute much to efforts to mobilize
local-level resources - another oft-mentioned goal.
The problem is not so much that resources do not
exist at the grass roots - some do, even in very
poor countries. The main difficulty is that elected
politicians are disinclined to impose fresh taxes,
lest they become unpopular with their constituents.
They are especially concerned about taxing prosper-
ous groups - those from whom most mobilizable
resources would need to be raised - since most
elected councillors come from such groups and
they often depend mainly on those groups for
re-election.
A limited amount of countervailing evidence to the
comments in the previous paragraph has, how-
ever, emerged from Africa. In Uganda, elected local
councils have succeeded in imposing new taxes
without serious resistance from below, because
citizens have been persuaded that this will produce
tangible benefits. Fragmentary evidence from
Nigerias reinforces this point. There is also evidence
from a wider array of African countries to indicate
that decentralization strengthens the tradition
(which is much stronger there than in most of Asia)
of voluntary contributions from within local com-
munities to fund grass roots development projects.
Finally, it is unrealistic to expect decentralization to
enhance the effectiveness of government institu-
tions in alleviating poverty and assisting vulnerable
8 J am grateful to Dele Olowu for this information.
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groups. Representatives of poorer, low status
groups usually have more influence at higher levels
in political systems than at the local level. In many
Indian states, for example, electoral considerations
compel political parties to provide significant
numbers of leaders from such groups at the state
level with ministerial posts. There is thus a kind
of power-sharing between prosperous elites and
poorer groups at that higher level. But village life in
most states is still largely dominated by prosperous,
landed elements.
As a result, decentralization in most Indian states
represents a shift of power and resources from a
level where the poor have some influence, to levels
where they have far less. Local councils in India
tend systematically to avoid fulfilling their legal
responsibilities to provide assistance to poor, low
status groups.9 If poverty programmes are to be
pursued seriously, it may therefore be best to
leave them in the hands of higher levels of gov-
ernment - unless (as is sometimes true) politicians
and bureaucrats at all levels are equally disinclined
to assist the poor.
Despite these drawbacks, however, it should be
clear that when it works well, decentralization has
much to recommend it. But evidence from recent
studies also suggests that in most parts of Africa and
Asia, it is quite difficult to make decentralization
work well. This takes some explaining.
4 IMPEDIMENTS TO MAKING
DECENTRALIZATION WORK WELL
Democratic decentralization can only work well
when two crucial prerequisites are met, and when at
least some of a longer list of helpful (but non-crucial)
conditions exist. In most less developed (and some
of the more developed) nations, these requirements
cannot be met with any adequacy.
What are the crucial prerequisites? We have already
noted that it is essential that decentralization be
democratic - mere deconcentration will not produce
many benefits and may make things worse. But
that is a rather crude statement which does not take
us very far. To be more specific, it is crucial that
decentralized institutions be accountable - in two
Crook and Manor, 'Enhancing participation and institutional
performance: democratic decentralization in South Asia and West
Africa', Report to the Overseas DevelopmentAdmínistration,Januaiy
1994, chapter two.
ways. First, bureaucrats must be accountable to
elected members of decentralized councils. Second,
elected councillors must be accountable to citizens.
Neither type of accountability is easy to achieve. In
countries where democracy has been either non-
existent or an off-and-on phenomenon, bureaucrats
tend to have little regard for politicians - especially
the sort of small fry who get elected to decentralized
councils. Even if they overcome their disinclination
to cooperate, bureaucrats often lack important
skills which they need to work productively with
elected leaders. These include the ability to accept
unwelcome orders, to provide elected politicians
with information and options without seeming
overbearing, or to urge caution or play the devil's
advocate without provoking a clash of minds, etc..
Many civil servants also find themselves torn be-
tween their duty to elected politicians and their
desire to please bureaucratic superiors higher up in
their ministries. For these and other reasons, it is
hard to ensure accountability of bureaucrats to
elected politicians.
It is also hard to ensure that politicians remain
accountable to voters. One widespread problem
here is the tendency of politicians in central govern-
ments to cultivate heads of elected councils as
backers. This is particularly common when a decen-
tralized system has been created mainly to provide
national leaders who have seized power by force
with a much-needed support base and an air of
democratic legitimacy. When for example General
Ershad, the Bangladeshi dictator, gave chairmen of
the sub-district councils that he created carte
blanche to misbehave in any way they liked, he
caused them to feel more accountable to him than to
their constituents.'°
Even when this problem does not arise, elected
councillors often fail to maintain regular contacts
with voters. This tends to happen even in systems
which impose legal requirements on them to do so.
They find it irksome to keep facing complaints and
pressure for favours, despite the fact that these
often reflect unrealistic expectations which the
councillors themselves may have inspired in earlier
election speeches. Politicians in countries without
sustained experiences of democratic politics are es-
pecially likely to cut themselves off from citizens,
partly because they have not fully internalized the
Ibid., chapter three.
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notion that the state and elected leaders have
obligations to the electorate - a point discussed
more fully below.
The second crucial prerequisite for a successful de-
centralized system is adequate resources for elected
councils. Some analysts - especially specialists in
public administration - are inordinately worried
that if councils receive most of their resources from
higher levels of government, they will be controlled
from above. In other words, these analysts fix on
the issue of the formal autonomy of councils more
than the amount of resources available to them.
Recent research indicates, however, that the avail-
ability of sufficient resources - even if they come
from higher levels - tends to ensure in practice that
councils will have substantial autonomy.
Here and elsewhere, the public administration lit-
erature is excessively preoccupied with the formal
rules of decentralized systems. It pays too little heed
to the informalities of politics. A little empirical
research on the actual machinations of elected
politicians would quickly show that members of
well resourced councils usually find ways of assert-
ing their authority and achieving considerable
autonomy by bending or eluding the formal rules.
That may appear hopelessly untidy and even repre-
hensible to those who fix on the rules, but it is how
democratic politics inevitably works, and it often
produces creative outcomes.
There are often, of course, real constraints on the
amount of resources which higher levels of gov-
ernment can make available to decentralized institu-
tions. This is especially true when national regimes
are engaged in structural adjustment programmes
that entail cuts in public expenditure (but not only
then). Structural adjustment in Ghana (together
with bad faith on the part of national politicians)
wrecked its decentralization experiment. It has
caused less serious problems in Uganda, and eco-
nomic liberalization in India may create similar
difficulties for the national decentralization scheme
that is being undertaken in consonance with two
constitutional amendments in 1993. A fiscal crisis in
Côte d'Ivoire in 1988 paralysed local councils that
had previously developed promisingly, when funds
from above were available. This set of issues is
examined further in the next section of this article.
What other, less crucial factors help decentraliza-
tion to work well? Multi-party competition is one
of these. If the party which enjoys a majority on an
elected council is faced by opposition forces who
are constantly on the look out for mistakes, ineffi-
ciencies and malfeasance by those in control, then
th8 power of the ruling groups will be checked and
the cause of transparency will be served. This is
true even if the opposition goes to excess in accus-
ing the ruling party of dirty doings - as it frequently
does. The proceedings of such councils often
appear unseemly, petty and needlessly turbulent,
but this process facilitates restraint, probity and
accountability by power holders.
It is often argued that local government works best
when political parties are kept out of elected coun-
cils, but this is both naive and misguided. It is naive
because in countries with lively party competition,
parties find ways of extending their influence
onto low-level councils, even if this is barred by law.
It is misguided because although party competition
on councils quickens conflict within lower-level
areas (and therefore makes community-wide par-
ticipation in development activities less likely),
such competition tends to make government more
transparent, clean, responsive and accountable.
The problem here is not the excesses of parties, but
the fact that in many countries, multi-party cornpeti-
tion scarcely occurs. If democratic decentralization
is undertaken in a country with a one-party system,
or where party competition has not developed very
far or is effectively thwarted by higher political
authorities, then the benefits which follow from
conflict between parties on decentralized councils
will not be realized. Since most countries in Africa
and Asia fit one of these descriptions, it is difficult
for democratic decentralization to flourish in them.
Another factor that can facilitate the working of
decentralization is a free and lively press. When
journalists with an investigative bent follow the
proceedings of elected councils closely, and report
on lively exchanges between forces on councils
(including accusations from the opposition of mal-
feasance and poor performance), the business of
government becomes more transparent and pres-
sure mounts on politicians to behave responsibly
and responsively. But we find here again, that in
many African and Asian countries, the press is
sufficiently hemmed in or intimidated that it cannot
Ibid., chapter two.
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do much to facilitate the working of democratic
decentralization. Newspapers are also often poorly
developed in outlying areas where decentralized
councils operate.
Decentralization works best when it encounters a
lively civil society (that is, organized interests with
some autonomy from the state). If social groups are
aware, assertive and well organized for political
purposes, they are likely to keep elected representa-
tives well informed of their problems, and hard
pressed for responses and for effective, honest
governance. But in much of Africa and Asia, organ-
ized interests have had so few opportunities to
interact with powerholders that they are unused to
this. They often lack organization, understanding,
sophistication and effective leadership with the
skills to extract responses from politicians and
bureaucrats. Even if they possess some of these,
they may have grown heartily cynical about the
capacity of government to achieve anything posi-
tive. In many more extreme cases, the state has
coerced and intimidated social groups for so long
that they have come to regard politics as a danger-
ous game that is best avoided.
In all of these circumstances, it is difficult for healthy
collaboration and (yes) conflict to develop between
elected representatives and civil society. Problems
can also emerge when things go to the opposite
extreme - when organized interests are so exceed-
ingly lively that they are hugely impatient and
place heavy demands on politicians in new and/or
inadequately resourced institutions that are still
finding their way. If those institutions were strong
and well-funded, they could probably cope crea-
tively even with a volatile civil society. But this is
seldom the case, and volatility can often overwhelm
decentralized bodies before they can establish
constructive relationships with society.
One further, related aid to the workings of such
bodies is a set of attitudes that has seldom taken
firm root in most parts of Asia and Africa. If both
citizens and elected leaders believe that the state and
politicians have heavy obligations to the voters who
put them in office, it is far easier to ensure that
decentralized councils will be accountable to citi-
zens. This notion has achieved wide currency in
India, where it helped decentralized councils to
form creative connections to social groups and
operated as a check on excesses by politicians.11
But in most of the rest of Asia and Africa, where
democratic politics have not been sustained for as
long as in India, such attitudes have not taken
hold to anything like the same extent.
A prolonged experience of democratic politics also
helps in the development of tolerably constructive
relations between councillors and bureaucrats - and
thus to ensure the other type of accountability, of
civil servants to elected representatives. This is
partly a matter of attitudes and partly a matter of
skills. If democracy is seen as the norm, as the way
government does its business, then bureaucrats
will be inclined to develop a modus vivendi with
politicians, even though they may not enjoy it. A
long experience with democratic processes will
also have taught both politicians and civil servants
skills mentioned earlier, ways of dealing with each
other in a spirit of give and take, that help to make
decentralized councils reasonably effective and re-
sponsive tosociety. But since in most of Africa and
Asia, democracy has existed either intermittently or
not at all, these attitudes and skills - which were
patently present in the Indian episode - are hard to
find.
5 HELPING DECENTRALIZATION TO WORK
WELL
The most important comments here follow logically
from the opening remarks in the previous section. If
higher authorities want decentralized institutions
to achieve things, they must see that they have
adequate resources and they must seek to ensure
that elected councillors possess the powers to make
bureaucrats accountable to them, and that council-
lors can be made accountable to citizens.
Most of the councils' resources will need to be pro-
vided from above, at least in the first few years of
their existence and possibly well beyond. This is
true because major impediments stand in the way of
local resource mobilization by councils, as we noted
in the previous section.
Citizens at the grass roots, particularly in Africa,
recall earlier episodes in which local councils im-
posed taxes and then provided few tangible ben-
efits. They are therefore understandably reluctant to
pay existing or newly imposed taxes to either na-
tional or local authorities. If decentralized councils
are given enough resources from above to show that
they can provide benefits, then popular cynicism
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may be eroded, and the willingness to pay taxes
may increase. Those who argue, perhaps rightly,
that the proper use of locally-raised tax revenues can
enhance the legitimacy of government need to un-
derstand that before this can happen, action may be
needed to overcome well-founded cynicism among
people at the grass roots about paying any taxes.
lt is unwise for higher authorities to attempt to
create democratic, decentralized institutions at the
same time as they are implementing significant
financial cut-backs. That usually implies that
elected councils will have fewer resources available
to them than government agencies had before their
creation. That inevitably causes them to disappoint
voters, since they cannot deliver the quantity of
projects and services that were previously forth-
coming. Councils will then be blamed for some-
thing which is the fault of higher authority, and this
can undermine the legitimacy of the decentralized
system.
The main contribution which higher authorities
can make to ensuring accountability is in relations
between bureaucrats and councillors. By taking
steps (i) to prevent politicians or bureaucrats at
higher levels from trying to control low-level
bureaucrats, at the expense of elected councilors'
influence over them, and (ii) to strengthen the hands
of councillors in their dealings with bureaucrats,
they can make a difference.
There is much less that they can do in a positive
sense to ensure that councillors remain accountable
to voters - other than holding fresh elections on
time, something which higher authorities are often
reluctant to do. This kind of accountability must, in
the main, emerge from interactions between coun-
cillors and citizens. There are, however, some
negative actions which higher authorities can avoid.
If a political regime at the national level allows or
even encourages elected councillors to get away
with dubious actions because it needs their political
support, as was the case in Ershad's Bangladesh,
this can distract council leaders from the need to act
accountably towards voters. This has proved to be
a widespread problem which can seriously under-
mine experiments with decentralization.
People who design decentralized systems should
also take note of one further, mundane point. It is
far easier to make democratic decentralization work
if elected councils are created at levels to which the
government has already deconcentrated bureau-
cratic agencies. If that has happened, then all that is
required is a transfer of control of bureaucrats to
newly elected councils. That can prove difficult, but
it is still far easier than trying to deconcentrate a
bureaucracy to new levels at the same time as you
try to create new councils there as well. The latter
task is much more complicated than the former.
One huge problem here is that central governments
that undertake democratic decentralization often do
not do so wholeheartedly. Even when they do, once
decentralized systems are in place, politicians at
higher levels discover that decentralization means
ceding power to elected representatives lower
down. Once their jealousy is roused, they react in
ways that damage decentralization - by manipu-
lating the system in order to erode the resources,
autonomy and accountability mechanisms avail-
able to lower-level councils.
It is exceedingly difficult to protect decentralized
systems against this sort of thing. Indeed, it is
probably the single most serious threat to even
halfway effective performance by elected councils.
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We have seen legislatures at the state level in
Karnataka, India and at the national level in Bangla-
desh pass new laws within the last three years that
undercut the once formidable powers of councils
there.
Even constitutional amendments to strengthen de-
centralization in countries where constitutions are
taken seriously do not always produce the intended
outcomes. In 1993, the Indians amended their con-
stitution to bolster decentralization, but the laws
which many state governments have since put in
place to conform to the new constitutional require-
ments have intentionally denied the new councils
the powers and resources that they require to oper-
ate effectively.
It is therefore difficult to be optimistic that the
current wave of decentralizations being under-
taken and considered across much of the world will
produce the kind of benefits of which democratic
decentralization is demonstrably capable in the
best of circumstances. Itcan produce better govern-
ance, but the difficulties that stand in the way of that
make it unwise to expect that it is likely to do so.
